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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter introduces the social psychology of ethnic and political division in 
Northern Ireland, documents continuing segregation and division since the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, and calls for culturally oriented conflict 
transformation. Many of the circumstances on which unionists and loyalists 
based their political assumptions and the institutions on which they relied have 
changed significantly. Feelings of disorientation and alienation persist. With the 
end of Direct Rule, political persuasion, lobbying, public relations, and 
grassroots organizing have become increasingly important, and it is critical that 
unionists, and particularly working-class loyalists, feel empowered and have the 
organizing capacity to influence democratic politics without violence.
Keywords:   collective identity, conflict transformation, empowerment, ethnic identity, Northern 
Ireland, social psychology
But if we grant that symbolic systems are social products that contribute to 
making the world, that they do not simply mirror social relations but help 
constitute them, then one can, within limits, transform the world by 
transforming its representation.
—Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:14)
In 2005, as we drove through Portadown, a primarily Protestant Northern 
Ireland town, a friend and colleague who lives there pointed out a mural1 and 
said simply, “There's King Rat.” The mural featured a portrait of a man with 
close-cropped hair and a goatee flanked by garlands of poppies and orange lilies. 
Banners over and beneath the portrait read, “In honour of Grenadier William 
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‘Billy’ Wright LVF. ” Below, two masked gunmen wearing spats and white belts 
brandished automatic weapons and gazed up at the visage of Wright. Between 
them, a scroll displayed a verse from the New Testament of the Bible: “Greater 
love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends — John 
15:13” (see figures 1.1 and 1.2).
The mural on the Brownstown Road valorized a contentious figure who not only 
threatened Catholics but was a lightning rod for divisions within loyalist 
paramilitary organizations.2 Wright was a notorious dissident loyalist 
paramilitary leader who was ousted from the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and 
formed the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) in 1997 after his organization 
allegedly killed a Catholic taxi driver, Michael McGoldrick. In December 1997, 
Wright was assassinated in the Maze prison by fellow prisoners who were 
members of the republican Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). Like many 
murals, Wright's could conjure fear, mistrust, grief, triumph, or honor, depending 
on the viewer's own experience and perspective.
On a return visit to Portadown only two years later, I found that the mural had 
been replaced with a commemorative tribute to the famous footballer3 George 
Best, one of Europe's all-time best players who hailed from East Belfast. This 
time, the banners on the mural were blue and simply read, “George Best 1946– 
2005” above the logo of the Irish Football Association.4 This clear and 
intentional change in public symbols on the Brownstown Road has become 
common in Protestant, unionist, and loyalist (PUL) communities across Northern 
Ireland as initiatives are undertaken to alter familiar symbols and practices 
including flags, parades, and bonfires as part of a cultural transformation in the 
region.
In a commemorative garden a short distance from the mural, at the center of a 
flagstone patio sat a large polished granite stone with the inscription: “In 
memory of all victims of conflict.” In the background, at the rear corners of the 
patio, sat  (p.4)
Introduction
Page 3 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 04 November 2020
Figure 1.1  A mural honoring Billy 
Wright, a founder of the Loyalist 
Volunteer Force (LVF), photographed 
June 29, 2005.
two small tablets, each inscribed: 
“In loving memory of” alongside 
several individuals’ names. One 
held the names of Billy Wright and 
another LVF member; the other 
listed four UVF members. Each 
stone bore the familiar loyalist 
commemorative phrase, “At the 
going down of the sun and in the 
morning we will remember them,” 
from Laurence Binyon's poem, 
“For the Fallen” (see figures 1.3 
and 1.4).
I had the opportunity to 
interview Gareth and Daniel, 
two men involved with a local 
community organization that 
helped organize the mural 
redesign and commemorative 
garden.5 Gareth pointed out 
that the garden was carefully 
arranged so that the larger 
stone could be read by 
passersby on the sidewalk or 
the road while the smaller 
tablets were intentionally 
inclined upward so that they 
could only be read by people who entered the garden and walked to its back 
corners. The arrangement of the garden diminishes the prominence of the kinds 
of violent images and references that had dominated the original Billy Wright 
mural nearby. However, according to Gareth, the design of the mural and garden 
projects involved a difficult, months-long process of consultations, and while the 
removal of the Wright mural brought tears of grief to some eyes during the 
unveiling, others expressed  (p.5)
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Figure 1.2  A mural honoring Billy Wright 
was replaced with a mural celebrating 
George Best. Brownstown Road, 
Portadown, photographed January 20, 
2007.
their appreciation and a sense of 
liberation. He described the 
thought that went into the design 
of the garden:
The symbolic nature of those 
two constituencies [LVF and 
UVF] sharing the same space 
as a reflective space, I think, 
was a considerable 
achievement locally. But, we 
were very conscious we 
didn’t want that space to 
become a shrine for 
paramilitarism …. We then 
secured a huge bit of Mourne 
granite, and we said, “We 
want to rein this back into 
being a community space,” 
and there is a huge stone 
right in the middle that a 
blind man can see. Literally, 
“In loving memory of all 
victims of conflict,” full stop. 
You can interpret that 
whatever way you want.
One must wonder whether 
everyone grieving a victim of 
the conflict would feel comfortable reflecting on their loss in a garden in the 
presence of the two smaller stones, but the change is nonetheless significant.
Such shifts in the symbolic landscape lead us to inquire about concomitant 
changes in the social psychological landscape of a region where ethnopolitical 
conflict has been perpetuated by both violence and prejudices. If the downward 
spiral of fear and retaliation that characterized thirty years of paramilitary and 
military violence accompanied a proliferation of antagonistic symbols and  (p.6)
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Figure 1.3  Granite monuments to “all 
victims of conflict”. Brownstown Road, 
Portadown, photographed January 20, 
2007.
rituals, what accounts for a 
widespread, if incomplete, trend in 
the opposite direction? How are 
such changes negotiated within 
and between polarized 
communities? Who is involved in 
the mitigation of polarizing 
cultural expressions and why? 
What does the process look like, 
and what does it tell us about the 
potential to transform intractable 
conflict? Those are the questions 
we will explore.
Collective identities and the 
ritual and symbolic actions that 
shape and maintain them are 
recursively related with one 
another, and much of this book 
concerns itself with the 
renovation of public displays of Protestant unionist and loyalist identity. By 
redesigning bonfires and murals (such as, the Wright-Best mural in Portadown) 
or choreographing Orange and loyalist band parades in ways that mitigate some 
of their most offensive facets, unionist and loyalist activists introduce new values 
carefully reconciled with long-held understandings of their collective identities. 
The result is a softening of a politically charged symbolic landscape and a 
reconsideration of polarized ethnopolitical identities. In some cases, symbols can 
become shared across the ethnopolitical divide. In other cases, the process of 
adopting new symbols and practices or shaping collective memories through the 
construction of historical narratives can open opportunities for cross-community 
dialogue.
 (p.7)
This is not a post-conflict process 
but rather a continuation of 
conflict by other means. Conflict 
in Northern Ireland has long been 
contested by many means: 
political, economic, cultural, and 
military. The central story of the 
peace process has been a long 
shift away from violent and 
coercive methods toward 
persuasive and political ones, and 
we might do well to adopt 
Brewer's (2010) nomenclature of 
“post-violent society” while acknowledging (as Brewer does) that political and 
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Figure 1.4  Granite monument to Loyalist 
Volunteer Force (LVF) 
paramilitaries.Brownstown Road, 
Portadown, photographed January 20, 
2007.
sectarian violence does not necessarily end neatly when political negotiations get 
under way (Brewer 2010:16–28, 32–33). The conflict is, instead, in a state of transition. 
Such shifts are not merely the product of strategic calculations, though they may be 
shaped by pragmatism. They are imagined, debated, and adopted by people with 
collective identities that have been catalyzed in threatening, unjust, and often violent 
circumstances. Indeed, ethnic and political identities have become closely linked to 
calculuses of winning and losing. This is not to say that identities or strategies are 
monolithic. New strategies can be and have been introduced, but unless or until they 
align, or are made to align, with collective identities, they are unlikely to be fully 
adopted. How even the most ideologically committed organizations come to mitigate or 
replace violent or offensive activities warrants our attention as well as the ways in 
which collective identities and community relations change in tandem.
 (p.8) Although I have chosen 
to focus on the Protestant 
community, a study such as, this 
could be productively 
undertaken within Catholic and 
nationalist organizations and 
communities. Republican 
leaders in Sinn Féin, the largest political party within the republican movement, 
have carefully reframed republicanism since they rediscovered the potential of 
nonviolent action and then constitutional politics over the course of the hunger 
strike of 1981 (Shirlow and McGovern 1998). Protestants are arguably facing 
equal if not greater challenges in adapting to new political and economic 
circumstances. Many of the institutions around which Protestants, unionists, and 
loyalists historically rallied have been relinquished or suffer from decline. 
Working-class Protestants, especially, feel they need new organizing skills, a 
shared sense of confidence, and more social capital to participate and benefit 
fully in the newly emerging Northern Ireland.
This book documents an emerging, if tenuous, process in which prominent 
conservative unionist and loyalist organizations, such as, the Orange Order6 and 
other voluntary organizations, are seeking to cultivate political and social capital 
by abandoning practices that are seen as sectarian or offensive and engaging 
more proactively in public relations. These are unfamiliar strategies for 
Protestants who have tended to feel that change is a harbinger of defeat. Thus, 
the process of internal transformation is a slow and contentious one as leaders 
work to introduce new policies and practices while continuing to hew to deeply 
held beliefs about themselves, the conflict, and their role in it.
Brewer and Higgins (1998) identify three domains in which sectarianism and 
division have been perpetuated in Northern Ireland: ideas, individual behavior, 
and social structure.7 The prominence of each domain can vary across a range of 
social situations, such as, class divides, but each reinforces the others in an 
extensive system of division and inequality. Prejudices and stereotypes reflect 
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power differentials in the social structure and underpin destructive individual 
behavior in the forms of discrimination, intimidation, and violence (pp. 2, 183).
The structural contexts in which conflict transformation occurs are important, 
and much strong scholarship on Northern Ireland tracks the shifting interacting 
political, economic, and demographic contours that influence the trajectory of 
the region's conflict. Thus, chapter 3 will present essential historical and 
political background information that is essential for interpreting an ever- 
important micro-sociological context. In this book, I focus on ideas (cultural 
schemata and identities) and behavior (political and cultural collective action), 
asserting that conflict transformation involves both a shift from coercive means 
of engaging in conflict toward more persuasive ones as well as subjective 
redefinitions of in-groups and out-groups. Paradoxically, much of the critical 
work of transforming conflict and developing less polarized collective identities 
takes place within even the most conservative and traumatized communities and 
organizations, and we will consider the experience of Protestant/unionist/loyalist 
(PUL) activists and organizations in Northern Ireland where innovations in 
traditional cultural expressions contribute to reshaping the contours of unionist 
and loyalist identities.
 (p.9) Northern Ireland and the Possibility of Sustainable Peace
For a sustainable peace to emerge, emotions, identities, and ideologies, as well 
as the rituals and cultural expressions that sustain them, must begin to 
accommodate one another. The process of replacing a culture of mistrust and 
fear with one of cooperation is a slow tenuous process, and contention across 
the ethnopolitical divide will continue. However, we can say that a conflict is in a 
state of transformation when fundamentally polarized in-group and out-group 
perceptions have begun to change, albeit slowly and incrementally. For more 
than twelve centuries, Ireland has been marked by legacies of invasion, 
colonialism, and conflict. With the wide-scale influx of English and Scottish 
settlers from the beginning of the seventeenth century and the subsequent 
rebellions and subjugation of the Gaelic Irish population, the stage was set for 
four centuries of conflict over the merits and injustice of British rule, even 
though the lines of contention never perfectly conformed to a religious divide 
between Catholics and Protestants. From the seventeenth century to World War 
II, economic interests, European geopolitics, and British concerns about the 
security of its western flank drove British policies with regard to Ireland. 
However, religious and ethnic divisions increasingly came to parallel political 
contention over issues such as, sovereignty and equality. The potent combination 
of divergent political agendas and ethnic and religious prejudice, or 
“sectarianism,” has limited dialogue, creative problem solving, and compromise, 
leaving suspicion, fear, and often violence to feed on one another (Liechty 1995; 
Liechty and Clegg 2001).
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Among cases such as, the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
and Israel/Palestine, in which core ethnopolitical identities have contributed to 
zero-sum mentalities, Northern Ireland has received considerable attention, 
especially with regard to “the Troubles,” the period of armed conflict among 
paramilitaries and state security forces that is usually considered to span the 
period from 1968 to 1998. The conflict produced over 3,700 deaths and ten 
times as many injuries between 1969 and 2001 (Smyth and Hamilton 2003:18– 
19). Thankfully, Northern Ireland has also become remarkable for its ongoing 
political peace process. Negotiations between the British government and the 
paramilitary Irish Republican Army (IRA) as well as between John Hume, the 
leader of the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Gerry 
Adams, the leader of the republican political party, Sinn Féin, developed into 
more than two decades of political negotiations involving the British and Irish 
governments, local parties, and international intermediaries.8
As the paramilitary cease-fires have remained relatively stable since 1994, and 
political negotiations have continued despite intermittent suspensions of the 
power sharing Northern Ireland Assembly9 that was established under the terms 
of the 1998 Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA), the prospects of a return 
to widespread violence have diminished, and the future of politics has  (p.10) 
increasingly become a question of when political institutions will stabilize. 
Backdoor political negotiations and all-party talks have led to a political peace 
process that, at the time of writing, features a legislative power sharing 
arrangement in the form of the Northern Ireland Assembly, led by Sinn Féin and 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), formerly the most diametrically opposed 
parties. After having been suspended several times, the resurrection of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in 2006 was followed by an executive partnership in 
2007 between firebrand Free Presbyterian Church founder and staunch unionist 
politician, Ian Paisley, and Martin McGuinness, who served as Officer 
Commanding of the Provisional IRA in Derry in the 1970s. The friendly 
relationship between the new first minister and deputy first minister astonished 
even the savviest pundits.
Northern Ireland's peace process and power sharing government have rightly 
become celebrated examples of patient and painstaking peacemaking 
underpinned by decades of largely unsung grassroots work by peace and conflict 
resolution organizations (PCROs). Yet, the challenge of grassroots peacebuilding 
remains (Cochrane and Dunn 2002; Fitzduff 2002; Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld 
2002).10 Significant structural and psychological barriers persist, not to mention 
the relative fragility of the political process. We should celebrate the tremendous 
progress that has been made in ending one of the world's longest running 
violent conflicts while acknowledging that the collective psychological and 
emotional wounds that need healing must continue to be addressed as all 
involved build a vibrant and cooperative democracy.
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Polarized ethnopolitical identities remain among the most significant obstacles 
to building a healthy multicultural civil society in Northern Ireland and 
elsewhere around the world. Subjective interpretations of the conflict and 
intercommunity and intracommunity relations among Protestants and Catholics 
are all subject to change, and yet, they are not easily changed, especially while 
the trauma of thirty years of recent violent conflict remains fresh. However, 
subjective dimensions of the conflict have been shifting in ways that have made 
space for much of the political progress to date and have in turn been facilitated 
by political developments, such as, the cease-fires and power sharing 
governance.
How political change takes place in the context of the paradoxical malleability 
and tenacity of ethnopolitical identities deserves attention (Hayes 1990:4). A 
sustainable peace depends on the ability of even the most ideologically 
committed organizations and individuals to develop new interpretations of 
themselves and adversaries that make space for dialogue, cooperation, and 
coexistence. By delving into the contemporary experience of Protestants 
involved with unionist and loyalist organizations and activities, we find an 
uncharted and difficult process of renegotiating the past, present, and future 
that is central to contemporary peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. This volume 
explores those subterranean cultural and social psychological processes that 
accompany the more visible headline-making developments in the political 
sphere.
 (p.11) In subsequent chapters, we will examine how charged ethnopolitical 
symbols and rituals among unionists and loyalists, such as, Orange parades, 
murals, music, dancing, and historical activities, influence and facilitate the 
construction of ethnopolitical identity. Among Protestants who have long felt 
“under siege,” redesigning murals to replace images of masked gunmen with 
local historical figures and World War I battle scenes in France and Belgium and 
working with the Northern Ireland Tourist Board to attract visitors to annual 
Orange parades signal a shift from their former defensive orientation. It is 
important to note that innovations in traditional cultural expressions are not 
attempts at reconciliation. They continue to communicate narratives of a 
distinctive Protestant experience and thus inscribe difference, but they 
constitute a reorientation, an interest in enhancing Protestants’ abilities to 
engage effectively in discourse and debate. The overall effect is to soften social 
psychological boundaries and make dialogue and relationship building across 
the ethnopolitical divide more likely. The results may seem modest, but they 
reflect the depth of division that has made intractable conflict so difficult to 
manage in Northern Ireland.
Intractable Ethnopolitical Conflict
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Intractable ethnopolitical conflict, of which Northern Ireland has been 
considered a primary case, has proven a prominent and growing global social 
problem over the past century and can be found at the root of most ongoing 
major violent conflicts and wars in recent decades (Scherrer 2008). Social 
scientists have struggled to conceptualize the powerful forces that can be 
generated when major political disputes parallel lines of ethnic and racial 
division. Symbolic expressions of ethnic identity and political ideology represent 
and reproduce psychocultural schemata in which groups find ontological 
security and through which organizations build consensus and mobilize for 
(sometimes violent) political action. Conflict over human rights, inequality, and 
sovereignty within disputed borders all take place within what Marc Ross (2009) 
has called contested “symbolic landscapes” in which collective senses of identity 
among warring or contending populations can become magnified and mutually 
polarized, providing fertile ground for fear, dehumanization, violence, and a 
downward spiral of retaliation and division.
Intractable ethnopolitical conflicts, which Mats Friberg and John Paul Lederach 
refer to as “identity conflicts,” are so tenacious in large part because they are 
driven by deeply psychological and emotional forces converging with large-scale 
structural forces (Lederach 1997:8). At the individual level, victims of bombings, 
assassinations, and punishment attacks struggle with the trauma that 
accompanies the brutalization of a neighbor or loved one. At group or 
community level, intimidation and fear encourage defensive attitudes, 
stereotyping, and racism or sectarianism as cultural schemata are constructed 
that interpret and legitimize the grievances and aspirations of each community, 
and in many cases, valorize  (p.12) those who have taken up arms in the name 
of communal defense (Liechty 1995:15; Brewer and Higgins 1998).
In extreme conflict situations, adversaries’ identities can become defined such 
that they are mutually opposed to one another, indivisible and nonnegotiable. 
They become inseparable from the conflict that comes to be understood in zero- 
sum terms of “us” and “them.” Using this calculus, any gain by one side amounts 
to an unacceptable loss by the other side. Each group feels as if its very 
existence is under threat, and each responds defensively, further modifying their 
own interpretive schemata to distinguish their opponents from themselves in 
even more stark terms, justifying more extreme action against opponents (Tajfel 
1981; Waddell and Cairns 1986; Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson 1989; 
Northrup 1997; Brewer and Higgins 1998; Coy and Woehrle 2000).
Such conflicts become “intractable” in part because the vicious cycle involving 
identity and violence becomes almost seamless. As Terrell Northrup (1992) 
points out, a cultural “collusion” can develop between adversaries in ethnic 
conflict. By defining themselves and each other primarily in terms of their 
mutual antagonism, they collude with each other in perpetuating the 
psychological bases for destructive conflict. Political struggles, such as, those in 
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Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, that 
have centered around core group identities are known to be particularly 
contentious and susceptible to intractability (Cairns 1994; Kriesberg 1998b; 
Northrup 1989).
Identity plays such a crucial role in these conflicts because shared schemata for 
perceiving and making sense of the world direct ethnic groups to interpret their 
actions and those of their opponents in ways that protect in-group ontological 
security (Kriesberg 2007:55–56, 157–58). Ross (2001) calls these schemata 
“psychocultural interpretations” or “the shared, deeply rooted worldviews that 
help groups make sense of daily life and provide psychologically meaningful 
accounts of a group's relationship with other groups, their actions and 
motives” (p. 189). Worldviews that become widely shared as “collective 
identities” are constructed and continually reconstructed from origin myths, 
historical narratives, commentary on contemporary states of affairs, and 
teleological visions (Brewer and Higgins 1998).
Ethnopolitical conflict features closely related symbolic and social dimensions. 
Narratives that shape collective identities may compel people to collective 
action, sometimes to violence. Participation in conflict shapes the way groups 
perceive themselves and their opponents and how they express collective 
identities. Rituals and the public display of symbols organize perceptions and 
call people to solidarity by celebrating in-group narratives and values and 
casting others in adversarial roles. They stake claims to rights and preferred 
political arrangements and demonstrate a collective will. Symbolic displays can 
themselves become central issues of contention, perpetuating conflict. Irish 
language signs and band parades, for example, are often said to mark out 
territory in Northern Ireland in exclusive ways.
 (p.13) Polarized communal identities are constructed and reconstructed on a 
daily basis over long periods of time, sometimes spectacularly (through 
intimidation and direct attacks) or symbolically (public rituals, flags, and 
emblems), and sometimes in quite mundane ways (what newspaper one buys, 
where one shops, or where one attends school) Hamilton, Hansson, Bell, and 
Toucas 2008. Each becomes invested with emotional value, and one of the 
greatest challenges in addressing intractable conflict in divided societies lies in 
slowing and reversing a vicious and yet, often subtle cycle of out-group 
prejudice, dehumanization, coercion, and fear. To the extent that opponents in 
an ethnopolitical conflict situation ignore, condone, or openly advocate 
exploitation over another group, those parties will heighten the boundaries 
between them by intensifying distinctions and casting blame. Inter-group 
boundaries can become so rigid and others vilified and dehumanized to such an 
extent that group members become more likely to sanction, overlook, or employ 
the use of lethal force, fueling a cycle of fear, retribution, and division.
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In intractable conflicts, according to social identity theorists, natural tendencies 
to create in-group and out-group distinctions become heightened as each group 
feels under threat and rallies around increasingly defensive collective identities 
seeking to maintain ontological security. It is worth noting, however, that the 
construction of in-group and out-group identities is part and parcel of social life. 
Cognitive psychologists assert that all people have a limited capacity for 
processing stimuli from the world around them. They simplify the world through 
social schemata, stereotypes, or ideologies, thus meeting a need for ontological 
coherence (Tajfel 1982; Cairns 1994). They are also compelled to maintain a 
positive sense of self-worth, self-efficacy, and self-authenticity (Melucci 1995; 
Gecas 2000). The combination of these drives produces solidarity and in-group 
cohesion, while comparison with out-groups facilitates the process. Two leading 
scholars of social identity theory, Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, (1986) have 
derived the following theoretical principles:
Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity.
Positive social identity is based largely on favorable comparisons that can 
be made between the in-group and some relevant out-groups: the in-group 
must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant 
out-groups.
When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave 
their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to 
make their existing group more positively distinct (p. 16).
Unfortunately, in deeply divided societies in which groups have come to fear one 
another, the option of leaving one's own group is often limited, either because 
social solidarity costs are too high, or there simply are not other groups readily 
available to which one can switch.
As Ed Cairns (1994), a psychologist at the University of Ulster in Northern 
Ireland, has put it, “What I hope Social Identity Theory will do is influence 
people  (p.14) to see the conflict as a form of behavior which is determined by 
essentially normal psychological processes, but normal psychological processes 
which are operating in exceptional circumstances” (p. 14). Those circumstances 
include a long history of colonialism, resistance, discrimination, open conflict, 
and in many cases poverty. Political struggles of this sort that involve core group 
identities have proven particularly contentious and susceptible to intractability 
(Kriesberg, Northrup, and Thorson 1989; Northrup 1989; Cairns 1994; Kriesberg 
1998b; Weiner 1998; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2005). Once destructive 
conflict is under way, a range of factors can cause the conflict to deepen. These 
include groupthink, organizational inertia, specialized vested interests, 
miscommunications, coercive strategies, changes in organizational makeup, and 
external intervention (Kriesberg 2007:155–81). The institutionalization of 
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conflict parallels the polarization of ethnopolitical identities contributing to a 
vicious cycle of conflict escalation.
Ethnopolitical Division in Northern Ireland
A range of political, religious, and ethnic traditions in Northern Ireland tend to 
align broadly into Protestant/unionist/loyalist and Catholic/nationalist/republican 
blocs that maintain incompatible views on the history and sovereignty of six of 
the nine counties that make up the region called Ulster.11 Over centuries of 
conflict in Ireland, especially since the late eighteenth century, and more 
recently over the course of the “Troubles,” from approximately 1968 to 1998, 
Northern Ireland has become a deeply divided society in which Protestants and 
Catholics have been pushed and pulled into segregated public and cultural 
spheres. Often, division and segregation have been the direct result of British 
colonialism, unionist rule through the middle of the twentieth century, 
paramilitary intimidation, and radical political movements. Protestants and 
Catholics have also routinely segregated themselves in education, housing, 
sports, and arts, to name a few domains. Motivating factors include fear, anger, 
habit, familiarity, and tradition, and while a great deal of attention is paid to the 
working-class communities in which paramilitarism and the state's counter- 
terrorism efforts have been focused, ethnopolitical division is subtly perpetuated 
throughout society (Liechty and Clegg 2001:107–10).
Over a decade after the signing of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,12 
Northern Ireland remains significantly divided despite continuing progress in 
developing a pluralist agenda (Hughes, Donnelly, Robinson, and Dowds 2003; 
MacGinty, Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007). The consultation paper A Shared 
Future (2003) published by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister outlines concerns over ongoing ethnopolitical division.
• In order to achieve this vision we must deal with the very deep and 
painful divisions in our society that have been exacerbated by more 
than 30 years of conflict. Some progress has been made, but there is 
clear evidence that deep divisions remain.
 (p.15) • Violence at interfaces between communities continues to 
affect lives, property, businesses and public services.
• Whilst levels of tolerance and respect for diversity within the 
Protestant and Catholic Communities had been improving, there is 
evidence that they have decreased recently.
• Housing has become more segregated over the last 20 years. More 
than 70% of Housing Executive Estates are more than 90% Protestant 
or more than 90% Roman Catholic.
• Around 95% of children still attend separated schools. Despite 
evidence that more parents would prefer this option, there has only 
been a small increase in the number of children attending integrated 
schools.
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• There are high levels of racial prejudice in Northern Ireland and the 
situation has recently become worse. The rate of racial incidents here 
is estimated at 16.4 per 1000 non-white population, compared to 
12.65 per 1000 in England and Wales.
• There is little change in the extent of inter-community friendship 
patterns.
• In some urban areas further divisions are emerging within local 
communities. This is linked to paramilitary influence, especially at 
interfaces.
• People's lives continue to be shaped by community division. 
Research suggests that, in some areas, community division plays a 
large part in the choices that people make about where they work, 
and how they use leisure facilities and public services.
• Northern Ireland remains a deeply segregated society with little 
indication of progress towards becoming more tolerant or inclusive. 
(pp. 1–2)
As Stephen Farry (2006), a former general secretary of the Alliance Party, has 
declared in a United States Institute for Peace Special Report on Northern 
Ireland, “Peace has come at the price of reconciliation” (p. 27).
Survey research indicates that despite progress in consociational political 
arrangements, social attitudes remain significantly polarized. More worryingly, 
young people's attitudes tend to be less favorable to integration than adults’, 
especially among Protestant youth (McAuley 2004a; Leonard 2008; Hayes and 
McAllister 2009). According to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 
(NILTS),13 the decade leading up to and immediately following the signing of the 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (1989–1999) witnessed a general improvement 
in adults’ attitudes about community relations, especially among Catholic 
respondents. However, between 1996 and 1999, both Protestants (17 percent to 
26 percent) and Catholics (11 percent to 18 percent) increasingly reported 
wishing to live in neighborhoods populated by only people of their own religious 
background, essentially returning to 1989 levels.14 The same trend held for 
preferred workplace arrangements, though more Catholic adults (57 percent 
rising to 72 percent) came to prefer integrated schools in contrast to fewer 
Protestant adults (65 percent declining to 57 percent), a  (p.16) trend that 
fluctuated between Protestants and Catholics until 2003 when Protestants began 
to more consistently prefer mixed religion schools (ARK 1998–2008; Hughes and 
Donnelly 2003:652–53; Hayes and McAllister 2009).
Census data for 2001 show that 66 percent of the population in Northern Ireland 
live in areas that are more than 99 percent Protestant or more than 99 percent 
Catholic (up from 63 percent at the 1991 census; Brown 2002; Shirlow 2003). 
The 2003 Young Life and Times (YLT) survey of 16-year-olds in Northern Ireland 
reports that living in segregated areas significantly diminishes the likelihood of 
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having friends from the other religious community (Devine and Schubotz 2004: 
2–3),15 and research by Peter Shirlow (2003) indicates that 68 percent of 18- to 
25-year-olds in neighborhoods in Belfast separated by “peace lines” have never 
had a meaningful conversation with anyone from the other (Protestant/Catholic) 
community.
Attitudes about mixing tend to be more stable than attitudes about community 
relations (Schubotz and Devine 2009:4), and among adult respondents who 
participated in the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes and NILTS surveys, Hughes 
et al. (2003) have noted a growing pessimism about the state of community 
relations since the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was signed, especially among 
Protestants. By 2001, the percentage believing relations between Protestants 
and Catholics “are better now than five years ago” had returned to nearly 1994 
levels (before Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries declared cease-fires) of just 
below 30 percent. The same was true for Protestants’ predictions of the state of 
community relations in five years’ time.
As of 2003, the YLT survey indicated that youth attitudes about community 
relations were ambiguous. Large minorities of respondents reported 
“favourable” attitudes toward the other community (38 percent for Protestants; 
45 percent for Catholic), and larger percentages were more likely to say they felt 
“neither favourable nor unfavourable” toward the other community (49 percent 
for Protestants and 43 percent for Catholics). Just over half reported that they 
often or sometimes socialized with people from a different religious background. 
Levels of geographical segregation seemed more severe than youths’ attitudes, 
but national identities remained important for three out of five YLT respondents 
(Devine and Schubotz 2004; Muldoon, Trew, Todd, Rougier, and McLaughlin 
2007). From 2003 to 2007, 16-year-olds in the YLT have been significantly and 
consistently less open than NILTS adults to religious mixing in neighborhoods, 
workplaces, and schools. In 2007, just under 50 percent of youth (Protestant and 
Catholic) supported integrated educational settings, with Catholics more 
reticent than Protestants (Schubotz and Devine 2009).
The picture with regard to community relations has improved but continues to 
signal fundamental divisions. By 2008, in the wake of renewed devolution, the 
percentage of adult respondents reporting they felt relations were better than 
five years ago had more than doubled from 2001 to 65 percent. Preferences for 
mixed religion neighborhoods rose to 83 percent, preferences for mixed 
educational settings rose to 70 percent, and preferences for mixed religion 
workplaces rose  (p.17) to 94 percent. In each of these domains, percentages 
fell between 2 percent and 8 percent in 2009 for adults, and while youths’ 
attitudes tracked adults’ on improvements in community relations, they 
continued to lag on integration concerns by 17 percent to 20 percent (ARK 
2008a,b; ARK 2009a,b). NILTS results indicate rising optimism among adults, 
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but the potential for polarization remains, especially considering youth 
preferences to maintain structural divides along traditional ethnonational lines.
Though this study focuses on adults, it delves into the social landscape where 
deeply socialized identities, political fears, and their expressions meet new 
structural circumstances and inspire strategizing and innovation. To capture the 
deeply held beliefs and ideas that constitute communal identities and buttress 
prejudices and stereotypes and to document the strategic thinking and activities 
through which identity transformation occurs, it can be necessary to focus on 
one community or set of organizations on one side of an ethnopolitical divide 
instead of undertaking cross-community research. In this case, I have focused on 
Protestants, often on working-class Protestants, who, either by virtue of their 
organizational affiliation or the areas in which they live and work, endorse, 
advocate, or are familiar with unionist and loyalist ideology and identity, which I 
refer to as “grassroots unionism”; McAuley (1997) refers to this domain of 
unionism as “community unionism” or “communitarian unionism” (p. 159).
In focusing on a range of distinctly Protestant and unionist or loyalist 
organizations and communities in this project, I adopt Liechty and Clegg's 
(2001) “chastened ‘two-traditions’ logic,” which recognizes considerable 
religious, political, and economic diversity across Northern Ireland but also 
acknowledges an unavoidable and prominent religious and national divide 
between Protestants and Catholics (p. 36; Muldoon et al. 2007). In describing 
the divide, Eyben, Morrow, and Wilson (1997) said, “Churches, sports, political 
parties, central policy makers, law and order, local government, community 
sector, business all reflect, and sometimes contribute to the division of people in 
Northern Ireland into two major identity groups. Sometimes, the fault line 
appears dormant; at other times it lies wide open and raw. Whatever its state, it 
is always present” (p. 1). At the same time, identity change is a central theme of 
this book, and it is dangerous to generalize and overlook diversity within the 
Catholic and Protestant population (Rolston 1998; Nic Craith 2002). This is 
perhaps especially true for Protestants, among whom one finds considerable 
class divisions, a disjointed organizational infrastructure, and denominational 
divisions. I will endeavor to represent the complexity of intracommunity 
networks and worldviews (cf. Shirlow and McGovern 1997b), but I will also 
address experiences that are commonly shared among many Protestants, 
whether they prefer to define themselves as Protestants, unionists, or loyalists, 
and thus I will often refer to the Protestant/unionist/loyalist (PUL) population or 
community. That said, the data collected for this project lean toward working- 
class and traditional organizations and “hard to reach” communities where one 
finds strong Orange, loyalist, or unionist in-group identification.
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 (p.18) Protestants, Unionists, Loyalists, and Ethnopolitical Identification
Since the partition of Northern Ireland in 1921 and throughout the Troubles, 
Protestants have depended on political ascendancy and the strategic and 
political interests of British governments to protect, both militarily and 
economically, what Protestants have considered a necessary refuge in Ulster. 
The proroguing of the unionist controlled Stormont government that presided 
over Northern Ireland affairs from partition of the island in 1921 (separating 
Northern Ireland from the southern Irish Free State) until the imposition of 
Direct Rule from London in 1972 was a bitter pill for many unionists. However, it 
was preferable to the alternative of a wholesale British withdrawal, the potential 
of a civil war, and the prospects of becoming absorbed into a united Ireland 
(Walker 2004:195–96). During thirty years of the Troubles, most Protestant 
unionists’ attentions were turned to maintaining strategic pressure on British 
governments through political maneuvering at Westminster and supporting the 
police and military, and in some cases, paramilitary forces.
Today, Direct Rule has ended, including the long-anticipated devolution of justice 
and policing powers; the principle of the consent of the majority has been 
enshrined in political agreements, and the responsibilities of government have 
been devolved to a power sharing executive at Stormont. Many of the 
circumstances on which unionists and loyalists based their assumptions about 
life in Northern Ireland have changed significantly. Under devolution, the 
concepts of civil society and politics take on greater significance, and many 
Protestants find themselves in a position for which they were not fully prepared. 
In the absence of normal politics, and with the exception of moments of crisis, 
there has been little development of an infrastructure of voluntary grassroots 
organizations. Under the threat of republicanism, unionist politicians wielded 
significant political capital in the halls of Westminster, but relatively little 
working social capital has developed among Protestant organizations.
Often, Protestant communities in need of resources, such as, jobs and housing, 
are not sufficiently empowered to advocate for and make full use of government 
programs. Research by Blackbourn and Rekawek (2007) argues that the social 
and economic dividends of peace have been pursued more aggressively in 
Catholic communities than Protestant ones (pp. 80–81). A sense of British 
identity remains strong among Protestants, and the union would appear 
politically secure for the foreseeable future, but the quality of that future now 
rests in their ability to organize and navigate a new and changing political 
landscape.
In the introduction to their edited book on Protestants, unionists, and loyalists, 
Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern (1997a) express the importance of forging a 
new shared vision for relations on the island of Ireland: “In overall terms the 
crisis facing Ireland, North and South, Catholic and Protestant, Nationalist and 
Unionist, is to reconceptualise who ‘the People’ are in order to achieve a new 
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social and  (p.19) political consensus” (p. 9). Since the publication of their book, 
a young and contested political dispensation has developed through the 
negotiation of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and more recently through the 
reestablishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly via a remarkable coalition of 
Sinn Féin and the DUP, who were previously the most opposed among the large 
political parties. The “social consensus” that Shirlow and McGovern propose is 
less clear, however. Lingering sectarianism and polarized identities, while 
showing signs of improvement, constitute a vexing backdrop to the end of the 
Troubles and the establishment of power sharing governance.
Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland
If polarized and entrenched identities contribute to intractable conflict, the 
transformation of those identities into ones with less defensive and more 
inclusive orientations should occupy a central place in peacebuilding models. 
Constructivist models offer a framework for understanding the opportunities for 
and limits to identity change and the important role that symbols and cultural 
activities play in mediating identity change, and chapter 2 addresses the central 
role of identity formation in conflict transformation.
Three themes shape the analysis of conflict transformation among Protestant 
unionists and loyalists that follows: capacity building, cultural innovation, and 
pragmatic motivations. Cultural entrepreneurship figures prominently, but it is 
important to pay attention to the strategic imperatives that motivate cultural 
innovation and the organizational changes that contribute to the empowerment 
of alienated Protestants.
Capacity Building
Material conditions, the capacity to organize in pursuit of collective interests, 
and how a community perceives itself and its neighbors are closely related. Each 
feeds into the level of security or insecurity that influences whether various 
segments of unionism and loyalism are able and prepared to participate fully in 
planning for the future and the transformation of conflict in Northern Ireland. If 
fear, uncertainty, and inequality lie at the root of ethnopolitical conflict, conflict 
transformation involves the development of resources that empower polarized 
groups to engage nonviolently as equals and then acknowledge and take 
advantage of their interdependence (Eyben, Morrow, and Wilson 1997; Mac 
Ginty and du Toit 2007:29). Those resources may be political, economic, or 
cultural, and it is worth noting that the distribution of resources within the 
Protestant population is not uniform. Middle-class Protestants have been able to 
avoid the worst of the violence of the Troubles and have tended to maintain a 
comfortable distance from local politics, influencing policy through professional 
organizations that lobbied  (p.20) Direct Rule ministries. Historically, unionists 
have looked at relatively poorer economic conditions in the Republic of Ireland 
and argued that a united Ireland would mean being absorbed into an inferior 
economy without British subsidy and would inevitably sacrifice quality of life. 
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Middle-class unionists were no exception, and they oriented themselves toward 
Britain to pursue their business interests and send their children to university 
(Coulter 1997).
Working-class Protestants, with fortunes closely tied to manufacturing bases 
that predominated in Northern Ireland, have seen the union as inextricably 
linked with Ulster's industrial successes but have suffered from declines in 
industrial production and its replacement by service and technology industries. 
Economic and social problems including unemployment, low educational 
attainment, and substance abuse plague working-class Protestant communities. 
The trauma of the Troubles remains a fresh memory for adults and still echoes 
today in interface tensions and outbreaks of violence that perpetuate a sense of 
alienation, both from neighboring Catholic communities, which Protestants have 
watched advance economically and politically, and from the Protestant middle 
class, by which they feel abandoned (Blackbourn and Rekawek 2007). They 
therefore draw on whatever sense of security their collective identity as British 
citizens affords, insisting that their loyalty and service to the union, especially in 
terms of military service, amounts to political capital. However, they are 
simultaneously unsure or even skeptical about the value of that capital, as 
British governments have signaled their willingness to see Northern Ireland 
leave the union under the right conditions of popular consent (Coulter 1997: 
116). Undermining insecurity remains a fundamental task for improving 
community relations (Mac Ginty and du Toit 2007).
In her typology of approaches to community relations work, Mari Fitzduff (1991) 
refers to “contextual community relations work” as activities, such as, 
community development, building trusted and accessible security forces, 
encouraging pluralist or mixed environments to encourage contact, targeting 
social need, and training in critical thinking, that are necessary to create a 
suitable environment for improvements in community relations. Unfortunately, 
the fields of community relations and community development have often been 
disconnected from one another, and yet, both are fundamental to the prospects 
for sustainable peace (Eyben, Morrow, and Wilson 1997). This research takes up 
the challenge of assessing the extent to which and the ways in which 
organizations within the Protestant/unionist/loyalist (PUL) population are 
seeking to adapt themselves to new political circumstances by building social 
and cultural capital and organizing capacity.
Cultural Innovation and Collective Identities
In some cases, community development work parallels a kind of local single- 
identity work that involves modifying cultural expressions and undertaking 
historical education projects. To the extent that historical and cultural identity 
work  (p.21) helps to diminish a sense of uncertainty, builds confidence, enables 
cross-community cooperation, and develops organizing skills that allow 
grassroots organizations to advocate effectively for collective interests, it might 
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be considered part of conflict transformation, though we should also consider 
the countervailing trends that act as obstacles to such a process.
Modifying public expressions of collective identity, such as, parades and 
bonfires, that have traditionally been seen as triumphalist, cannot simply be 
programmed or made policy within an organization or community. The adoption 
of new schemata is never a wholesale proposition. New ideas are smuggled into 
group discourse in the very rituals and practices that sustain the continuity of 
collective identities. Change, even heresy, is never far from tradition. Often 
symbolic rituals, such as, bonfires and parades, can become sites at which 
somewhat unorthodox group members, out of devotion to a tradition or 
institution, seek to influence the discourse and dispositions of fellow 
participants. Symbols closely associated with authority and tradition retain their 
power even when they are appropriated and modified (within limits) to express 
new ideas and new iterations of collective identity (Kurtz 1983; Smithey and 
Young 2010).
Collective action and collective identity are thus closely related and mutually 
recursive; a change in one signals or requires a change in the other. To the 
extent that loyalists begin to emphasize publicly features of their identity that 
are not defensive or expressions of mistrust or antipathy toward Catholics and 
nationalists, they signal a new orientation across the political and ethnic divide. 
They aim to maintain in-group solidarity and ontological security through these 
practices, but as they adopt new forms that are less exclusive, they 
incrementally lower the salience of sectarian and ethnopolitical boundaries that 
have helped fuel conflict in Ireland and thus participate in conflict 
transformation.
Pragmatics and Public Relations
Attempts to reorient collective identities are influenced by groups’ perceptions 
of their adversaries and other influential social actors and are deeply implicated 
with the ways in which they present themselves to those parties. Cultural 
traditions projects attempt to shore up communal solidarity and improve 
community esteem and confidence, but they also reframe collective identity in 
ways that are more widely palatable to the general public, funders, and other 
sources of local and international support. Thus, there is a pragmatic dimension 
in which unionists and loyalists use cultural activities in the pursuit of political, 
social, and economic goals. Protestant interviewees often speak of their cultural 
traditions work in comparison with the successes that republicans have enjoyed 
in their own transition to politics, community organizing, and international 
public relations. Increasingly, Protestant organizations in Northern Ireland are 
undertaking to build capacity for social change by developing community 
organizing and public relations skills.
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 (p.22) Yet, decisions to emphasize particular features of group history or 
beliefs are not merely strategic. Leaders may not simply dictate core identities 
to members. Modifications must be negotiated by individuals and groups, 
sometimes leading to conflict internally, but the benefits to the group's political 
or social capital may incentivize such attempts to reframe group identity. This 
often takes the form of public relations work, media management, and the 
modification of public expressions of identity.
Overview of the Book
Unionists and loyalists have not abandoned their objections to nationalism, and 
they often continue to frame their agendas in relation to the real or imagined 
threat of a return to republican violence and restrictions on their cultural 
expressions. In this sense, ethnopolitical conflict in Northern Ireland continues 
but in ways that open possibilities for cooperation and constructive competition. 
Conflict is thereby transformed from the inside out among partisans, many of 
whom once prioritized paramilitary or military violence. In 1995, after the IRA 
committed itself to a cease-fire, Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Féin, 
famously declared, “They haven’t gone away, you know,” to the disgust of 
Protestants across Northern Ireland. (Many unionists still question whether the 
IRA has gone away if its Army Council continues to exist.) Portadown's District 
Orange Master, Daryl Hewitt, echoed the line after his Orange lodge's 
leadership met with Adams to discuss their dispute with nationalist Garvaghy 
Road residents (2008). Neither has gone away, but they have not stayed the 
same either.
The rest of this book examines a contested process by which self-described 
unionists and loyalists navigate a contested social psychological landscape 
where identity and action are inseparably intertwined. As we discuss in chapter 
2, conflict transformation involves changes in the way conflict is carried out. The 
political peace process, a form of sophisticated conflict management, has 
constructed an arena in which even the most militant parties believe they can 
pursue their core interests. Support for political parties remains one way of 
signaling collective identity, but as we will see in subsequent chapters, rituals 
and other symbolic activities offer another arena in which many unionists and 
loyalists are active and in which we find an intentional shift toward developing 
the arts of persuasion.
Chapter 3 details the development of the peace process and the political 
circumstances in which unionists and loyalists find themselves. Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 follow symbolic and ritualistic expressions of ethnopolitical identity 
through activities that are often associated with tradition or heritage, such as, 
murals, bonfires, parades, reenactments, and amateur historical pursuits. In 
each case, unionists and loyalists have been modifying some of their most 
cherished activities to expand their appeal within their own communities and 
further afield. Such modifications are important because they both reflect and 
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require that they can be justified within the frames of the collective identities 
they represent  (p.23) and thus become part of the slow iterative process of 
identity transformation as well.
The process is not purely endogenous to unionist and loyalist communities and 
organizations, though it must be said that that is where much of the action of 
conflict transformation occurs. As we discuss in chapter 6, sea changes in the 
political sphere have forced unionists and loyalists into reconsidering their 
positions and their futures. Some have resolved that they must develop a new 
political influence that is not purely associated with British patronage. The 
development of public relations skills is not surprisingly applied first to their 
most public expressions of identity. Moreover, the state has incentivized the 
mitigation of cultural expressions of identity, which fits into the consociational 
model embodied in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Thus, while much of the 
process of conflict transformation detailed in the book revolves around culture, 
identity, and emotion, there are important pragmatic dimensions to consider as 
well. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings, anticipates the future of 
conflict transformation in Northern Ireland, and raises cautionary questions 
about the potential limits and pitfalls that unionists and loyalists might 
encounter and the ramifications for community relations.
Notes:
(1.) Murals are large paintings, often found on the gable ends of houses that, 
historically, have displayed themes of ethnic identity and political ideology. 
During “the Troubles,” thirty years of armed conflict since the late 1960s, 
murals often valorized paramilitaries and armed struggle.
(2.) Republican and loyalist paramilitaries are non-state armed organizations 
formed to challenge or defend British rule and unionism in Ireland, respectively.
(3.) European football is called soccer in the United States.
(4.) Best had died only five months after my original visit to Wright's mural, 
which was redesigned and unveiled in May 2006. He had played for both 
Manchester United and Northern Ireland, and the mural portrayed him twice, 
once in his red Manchester uniform and again wearing his green Northern 
Ireland gear.
(5.) Extensive interviews were conducted within grassroots unionist 
organizations and communities. Excerpts of these interviews appear throughout 
the book. All interviewees were assigned pseudonyms.
(6.) The Orange Order is one of several all-male fraternal organizations that 
dedicate themselves to the preservation of the Protestant faith and British 
sovereignty in Ireland. The Orange Order is the best known, though others 
(some closely affiliated with the Orange Order) include the Apprentice Boys of 
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Derry, the Independent Orange Order, the Royal Black Preceptory, and the Royal 
Arch Purple. On July 12 each year, the Orange Order celebrates the victory in 
1698 of King William III's victory over the Jacobite forces of James II at the 
Battle of the Boyne. The Twelfth celebrations are preceded on the Eleventh 
Night by celebrations and the burning of large bonfires in Protestant 
communities across Northern Ireland. Tricolour flags of the Republic of Ireland 
and other nationalist or republican symbols are often burned with the bonfires.
(7.) Ruane and Todd's (1996) approach to conflict transformation similarly calls 
for action at cultural, structural, and relational levels (pp. 306–15).
(8.) The distinctions between unionism and loyalism or nationalism and 
republicanism are often not clear, and usage is contested, changing from context 
to context, but I offer a brief explanation here for readers uninitiated in 
Northern Ireland politics. In its broadest sense, nationalism refers to the 
universe of political positions that advocate a united Ireland. More specifically, 
“nationalist” refers to those people, primarily Catholic, whose political goals 
emphasize civil equality for all and redressing decades of discrimination against 
Catholics. Many nationalists value Gaelic culture and a united Ireland and prefer 
constitutional means of pursuing their political goals. “Republicans” are 
nationalists, often working class, who insist on equality and a united Ireland but 
have been willing to use both violent and institutional political means. The 
paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the political party Sinn 
Féin are the most prominent organizations within the republican movement.
Broadly, “unionism” refers to a commitment to Northern Ireland's remaining 
part of the United Kingdom. In its particular sense, unionism refers to a stance 
institutionalized in political parties supported primarily by Protestants (e.g., the 
Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party) that focuses on 
Northern Ireland's membership in the United Kingdom and British identity 
(Miller 1978; Hennessey 1996; Ruane and Todd 1996). “Loyalism” refers to an 
ideology or cultural stance held by many Protestants, usually working class, who 
insist on Northern Ireland's remaining part of the United Kingdom while also 
defending Protestant culture and identity. Loyalists’ cultural commitments may 
include Protestant evangelicalism and a contractual or covenantal view of their 
relationship to the British crown (Whyte 1990; Brewer and Higgins 1998). Like 
republicanism, the term “loyalism” also often refers to support for paramilitary 
organizations, such as, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF).
(9.) The Northern Ireland Assembly is the elected legislative body established by 
the 1998 Belfast or Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA).
(10.) “Peacebuilding” is often used to refer to initiatives that aim to transform 
attitudes and build capacity in civil society while “peacemaking” usually refers 
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to attempts to encourage dialogue and negotiations among political figures or 
individuals with political influence. “Peacekeeping” is a form of conflict 
management that includes the capacity to keep opponents from attacking one 
another (Galtung 1975:224; Ryan 1995).
(11.) Northern Ireland consists of six of the traditional nine counties of Ulster. 
Donegal, Monaghan, and Cavan remain in the Republic of Ireland.
(12.) After protracted negotiations, the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
established a power-sharing assembly in Northern Ireland. It was signed by 
major political parties on April 10, 1998, and it was endorsed in subsequent 
referenda in both the north and south.
(13.) The Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey is an annual omnibus survey 
conducted by Access Resource Knowledge Northern Ireland (ARK) and co- 
sponsored by Queen's University and the University of Ulster.
(14.) Research by Ian Shuttleworth and Chris Lloyd (2006) using 2001 census 
data, however, indicates that levels of actual segregation have probably 
remained the same throughout the 1990s, findings that moderate but do not 
extinguish concerns about levels of division between Catholics and Protestants.
(15.) Forty-seven percent of youth respondents living in primarily Catholic areas 
had no Protestant friends, and the corresponding rate for Protestants was 34 
percent.
